In Defense of Ambiguity

	Pat Hayes
	Florida IHMC

Theses

	There are two distinct relationships between names and things. Reference is different from access. The architecture of the Web determines access, but has no direct influence on reference
	Reference can be established by ostention or by description. Description is inherently ambiguous; ostention can be done only to accessible entities.
	Therefore, references to non-accessible entities - the vast majority of references - must be by description, and hence must be ambiguous.
	Reference to accessible entities still differs from access. Establishing reference by ostention requires naming conventions. Access is one form of ostention.

Two relations between names and things

	It is important to distinguish two different relationships between a name and a thing.
	ÔaccessesÕ, meaning that the name provides a causal pathway to the thing, mediated by the Web.
	ÔdenotesÕ or Ôrefers toÕ, meaning that the name is being used to mention the thing.
	WebArch uses ÔidentifiesÕ to mean both or either of these, apparently in the belief that they are synonyms. But they are not, and to think of them as being the same is to be profoundly confused. A great deal of the muddle we now find ourselves in can be directly traced to this confusion.

ÔaccessesÕ, meaning that the name provides a causal pathway to the thing, mediated by the Internet.

	Understand ÔaccessÕ as inclusively as possible, so this includes uses of an IRI to access a website, an http endpoint, a ÔrepresentationÕ (in the REST sense) of a resource, a server, a file, an html page, a mailbox, a webcam, É anything at all that can receive, send or be directly influenced by, or indeed itself be, any piece of information that can be transferred by a transfer protocol, either now or in the forseeable future.
	Cast this net as broadly as you like, the accessible things will always be an extremely small subset of the set of all things that can be referred to.  Moreover, although one can of course refer to accessible things, most acts of reference will be to things not in this class, because most of the worldÕs business is concerned with other things than the architecture of the internet. (Example: the weather in Oaxaca.)
	Historical note: the word ÔresourceÕ meant Ôaccessible thingÕ in the early writings of Engelbart and others. This corresponds fairly accurately to the English meaning of ÔresourceÕ, unlike subsequent W3C usage. The newer notion of Ôinformation resourceÕ might be similar to Ôaccessible thingÕ, but it may be narrower.

Access vs. Reference.

	Reference has to do with the semantics of language; access has to do with network architecture.
	Successful reference is part of a communication act between cognitive (language-using) agents. Successful access requires neither cognition nor linguistic communication.
	Access is mediated by transmission over a communication network, and uses energy. Reference is not a physical relationship and does not require any supporting architecture.
	Only Ôinformation resourcesÕ(?) can be accessed; anything at all can be referred to, even non-existent things.
	Access, in order to be useful, should be unambiguous. Reference to natural entities, in contrast, is inherently ambiguous.

Reference on the Web is the same as reference off the Web

	This is simply obvious, I claim. The Web is a transport mechanism for representations. But how a representation represents, and how the names in it refer, has nothing particularly to do with how the representations are transported. ( Korzybsky: ÒThe map is not the territoryÓ.)
	Reference has to do with the meaning of texts, broadly construed. The Web has extended the notion of text to hypertext, but adding markup to a text does not change its meaning qua text (*); and the use of URIs in RDF/OWL does not even qualify as markup. With a few exceptions (owl:imports, rdfs:seeAlso, etc,.) the Semantic Web languages would operate exactly unchanged if the identifiers in them were not URIs at all, and if the Web did not  exist.
	(*) One exception might be the ÔgesturalÕ use of a hyperlink , as in Òfor more on Julius Caesar, see <a href=Òhttp://www.ihmc.us/users/phayes/Julius.htmlÓ>here</a>, where the word ÒhereÓ refers to the accessed entity, much as one might gesture at a library shelf in ordinary conversation. But even such uses, while new in written language, have clear roots in spoken language use.

Reference on the Web is not determined by architecture

	Web architecture does not determine what any names, including URIs, refer to. It only determines what they access. The relationship between access and reference is essentially arbitrary; it is ours to decide.
	Since most of the things referred to by names are not accessible, references to them can only be determined by description, perhaps based on other pre-existing naming conventions. If, for example, a URI is intended to denote the city of Paris, this reference cannot be established by ostention, since Paris isnÕt accessible. It has to be done by description. And descriptions can never pin down a referent exactly. There will always be some slack, some possible doubt about what exactly is being referred to.

Reference by description is inherently ambiguous

	This claim may seem to fly in the face of common sense, so I will defend it. My point here is basically a re-statement of QuineÕs thesis of the radical indeterminancy of translation, but applied to communication. However, I inferred it from many observations in actual ontological practice.
	What does it mean to say that a name refers to a thing? There is nothing physical, no architectural infrastructure, which could possibly support such a claim: no ÔpathwayÕ from the name to its referent. And yet it seems clear that language does use names successfully to refer.
	We say that a name refers when a use of the name is sufficient to communicate a thought or a proposition about the referent, during an act of communication. The actual mental processes which constitute Ômental identificationÕ in human communication are mysterious. The best formal account we have, which also applies to the Semantic Web, says that this is a process of inference.
	The same considerations apply whether the agents involved are humans speaking English or Webbots drawing conclusions in OWL.

Reference by description is inherently ambiguous

	It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to make enough inferences so as to be sure that what the recipient understands a name to refer to is exactly the same thing as what the sender had in mind. Communication using referring names is always hostage to slips of reference. A formal version of this claim is based on GšdelÕs theorem: as long as the language used for communication is sufficient to express arithmetic, it will have ÔnonstandardÕ models.
	But the point is made better informally, by looking at normal human communication. Take the most direct and unambiguous kind of name, a public proper name of a public entity, say ÒParisÓ. This might refer to the central part of greater Paris defined by the arrondissements, or to the larger metropolitan area. It might refer to the state of the city now, or it might refer to the entire history of the city. In the right context, it can be used to refer to the inhabitants of Paris, the buildings in Paris, the customs of Paris, etc.. Another example: ÒEverestÓ. (How much does Everest weigh? Where are its edges)

Reference by description is inherently ambiguous

	Ordinary discourse is full of ambiguities which are rarely noted, because they have no practical importance, but which are rendered vivid by trying to agree about Ôcommon senseÕ well enough to write it down in a formal notation. My favorite example (apologies to those who have heard it before) was a disagreement about whether or not a fitted carpet was ÔinÕ an office or Ôpart ofÕ the office.
	Two competent, intelligent adult native speakers of English each discovered, to their mutual amazement, that another could believe such an obviously false claim. Over an hour of discussion it gradually emerged, by a process of induction from many examples, that they understood the meaning of ÔofficeÕ differently: for one it meant, roughly, an inhabitable place; for the other, something like a volume of space defined by the architectural walls.
	These two people never knew, until this event, that they had different mental meanings for ÔofficeÕ (in fact, more generally, for ÔroomÕ). Presumably this was possible because they had never previously engaged in a communicative act in which their conceptual differences made any difference to the communication: but note that each had, in fact, been understanding the English word ÔofficeÕ differently. So ÔofficeÕ and ÔroomÕ, in this instance, are ambiguous. Probably every word in English is ambiguous.

Saying more can make reference by description even more ambiguous

	Even when a stable situation of mutual reference has been reached, it can be upset by the addition of new vocabulary. Suppose two agents agree, somehow, that ÒBillÓ refers to a particular person.  Still, they might have divergent notions of what it means to be a person. Such divergences are already found in ÔstandardÕ ontologies. For example, Dolce requires a high-level distinction to be made between continuants and occurrents, and a person would naturally be classed as a continuant; but other ontologies reject this contrast and subsume all temporal entities under one heading.
	So are all names of persons rendered ambiguous by the presence of this high-level ontological divergence of opinion, so that we have to distinguish Pat_Hayes-the-continuant from Pat_Hayes-the-4d-history? For formal reasoning purposes, the difference is important, and indeed confusion between these concepts can produce immediate logical contradictions, such as inferring that I am both 62 years old and 7 years old (because I was once, and a continuant retains its identity through time.) And what of the reasoner who is simply not concerned with this distinction: do we need a Pat_Hayes-lite as well?

Saying more can make reference by description even more ambiguous

	Adding richer formal ontologies does not reduce ambiguity of reference, but INCREASES it, by providing for finer ontological distinctions.
	If all you want to say about persons is that they have mailboxes and friends, then you can treat ÔpersonÕ as a simple category. If however you want to reason about peopleÕs lifestyles, travel plans, medical histories and legal rights, then you may be obliged to distinguish finer categories of personhood. If you wish to include persons in a comprehensive Ôupper-levelÕ ontology, then more arcane questions about personhood and how it relates to existence must be answered.
	The more one is able to say and is obliged to reason about, the more possible distinctions there are to be made: and as the knowledge increases in scope, the more possibilities arise for making distinctions that were formerly impossible.

Saying more can make reference by description even more ambiguous

	What makes this kind of consideration particularly acute is the view that URIs should be global and eternal in scope. This makes things worse. It means that if there is any possibility of some such ontological distinction being made by anyone, anywhere, at any time, then in order to avoid ambiguity of reference, the URI must make all the potentially disambiguating decisions ahead of time, as it were: which is of course manifestly impossible, because there is always the possibility of some new distinction being made later.
	It is impossible to achieve unambiguous global reference of names by using descriptions. So we should not set out to attempt it, nor pose it as a goal or a Ôgood practiceÕ. The presence of the Web does not alter the nature of description or of reference, so the conclusion applies there also.

Since ambiguity is inevitable, letÕs make lemonade

	Since reference by description is inherently ambiguous, it might be better to set out to utilize the inevitable rather than try to minimize it.
	The ÔURI crisisÕ is said to result from phenomena like using the same name to refer to me and my website, or the same name to refer to the weather and the weather report. These are all examples of overloading (punning): using a single name to refer to multiple referents.
	Overloading isnÕt always as bad as it is rumored to be. It can be simply a way of using names efficiently. Natural language is rife with lexical ambiguity which does not hinder normal communication (rose, bank); programming languages routinely do it (+ means both integer and real addition); Common Logic allows a single name to denote an individual, a function and a relation (and IKL adds proposition to the list).

Since ambiguity is inevitable, letÕs make lemonade

	In general, overloading is harmless when it is possible to figure out from the information available at the time which of the various referents is intended by that particular use of the name. Often this is easy when the referents are in different ontological categories, as with a person and a web page.
	One way to think about overloading is that an overloaded term denotes a single Ôcomplex thingÕ which has all the usual referents as parts or facets, selected by implicit selectors. This often works surprisingly well: for example, the syntactic of logic (and RDF and OWL) is enough to ÔselectÕ the appropriate referent in the CL and IKL formal semantics. For people and websites it seems to work, also, for most purposes: I am not affected by an attempt to http GET me instead of my website, and my website isnÕt going to spend any of my salary. Inference is not affected by ambiguity of reference, of course; and the normal infrastructures of interaction with people and websites are sufficiently robust to disambiguate this kind of overloading when they need to be disambiguated.

Since ambiguity is inevitable, letÕs make lemonade

	Using the same URI to refer to me and to access my website isnÕt even an example of overloading. It only becomes that if we assume that the name which accesses the website therefore also refers to the website. But why do we make this assumption? There is nothing in the HTTP specs which seems to have anything particularly to do with reference.
	A suggestion: names (IRIs) refer to accessible things just when the thing is actually assigned that name; and assigning is done only by an explicit naming convention, by pointing to the object and asserting, this is called <name>. Unlike reference by description, this kind of naming can be completely unambiguous.
	There are two ways to point to an accessible object: by being it, or by using a URI which accesses it. (Access is a kind of Ôpointing gestureÕ.) The two kinds of naming convention this makes possible are similar respectively to wearing a name badge, and to having someone point at you and say, ÒI will call you SpidermanÓ.

Since ambiguity is inevitable, letÕs make lemonade

	Assigning a name to an accessible entity inside the entity itself makes the name ÔpermanentÕ and global in scope. Example: named graphs. For XHTML this could be done by a property in the header. It is under the control of the owner of the resource.
	Assigning a name by using a URI to access the thing being ÔchristenedÕ is under the control of the remote user of the URI, and the name assignment can be local in scope. (Note, this is consistent with the idea that URIs have global scope as accessing names.)
	But the key point is that we need some actual mechanism for assigning referents to names, even for objects on the Web. Right now we donÕt have any, because access isnÕt the same thing as reference.