¥Even when a
stable situation of mutual reference has been reached, it can be upset by the
addition of new vocabulary. Suppose two agents agree, somehow, that ÒBillÓ refers to
a particular person. Still, they
might have divergent notions of what it means to be a person. Such divergences are already
found in ÔstandardÕ ontologies. For example, Dolce requires a high-level
distinction to be made between continuants and occurrents, and a person
would naturally be classed as a continuant; but other ontologies reject
this contrast and subsume all temporal entities under one heading.
¥So are all
names of persons rendered ambiguous by the presence of this high-level ontological
divergence of opinion, so that we have to distinguish Pat_Hayes-the-continuant
from Pat_Hayes-the-4d-history? For formal reasoning purposes,
the difference is important, and indeed confusion between these concepts
can produce immediate logical contradictions, such as inferring that I am both 62
years old and 7 years old (because I was once, and a continuant retains its
identity through time.) And what of the reasoner who is simply not concerned
with this distinction: do we need a Pat_Hayes-lite as well?
¥