¥It is
difficult, perhaps impossible, to make enough inferences so as to be sure that what the recipient
understands a name to refer to is exactly the same thing as what the sender had in mind.
Communication using referring names is always hostage to
slips of reference. A formal version of this claim is based on GšdelÕs theorem: as long as the language used for communication is sufficient to
express arithmetic, it will have ÔnonstandardÕ models.
¥But the
point is made better informally, by looking at normal human communication. Take the most direct and unambiguous kind
of name, a public proper name of a public entity, say ÒParisÓ. This
might refer to the central part of greater Paris defined by the arrondissements, or to the larger metropolitan area. It might refer to the state
of the city now, or it might refer to the entire history of the city. In
the right context, it can be used to refer to the inhabitants of Paris, the
buildings in Paris, the customs of Paris, etc.. Another example: ÒEverestÓ. (How much does Everest weigh? Where are its edges)