¥Even when a
stable situation of mutual reference has been reached, it can be upset by the addition of new vocabulary. Suppose two agents
agree, somehow, that ÒBillÓ refers to a particular person. Still, they might have divergent
notions of what it means to be a person. Such divergences are already
found in ÔstandardÕ ontologies. For example, Dolce requires a high-level
distinction to be made between continuants and occurrents, and a person
would naturally be classed as a continuant; but other ontologies reject
this contrast and subsume all temporal entities under one heading.
¥So are all
names of persons rendered ambiguous by the presence of this high-level ontological divergence of opinion, so that we have to
distinguish Pat_Hayes-the-continuant from Pat_Hayes-the-4d-history? For formal
reasoning purposes, the difference is important, and indeed
confusion between these concepts can produce immediate logical contradictions,
such as inferring that I am both 62 years old and 7 years old (because I was once,
and a continuant retains its identity through time.) And what of the
reasoner who is simply not concerned with this distinction: do we need a
Pat_Hayes-lite as well?
¥